The paper will demonstrated that technical solutions do exist to all e-democracy security concerns and that tools do exists to implement safe and secure e-voting, but what about the politicians, do they really want it?

Electronic voting offers the potential of revolutionising the democratic process, but how can we trust it. This paper looks at the security challenges of multi-channel electronic voting, including the Internet, Fixed and Mobile Phones, kiosk and the conventional ballot box.

The paper will explain the security features defined in the OASIS, Election Mark-up Language (EML) specifications defined by Election and Voter Services Technical Committee.

The EML specification defines XML schema and standardises interfaces for interoperable e-voting systems, critical to the deployment of such systems is confidence and assurance in the security of such systems.

The key security requirements will be explained and the proposed technical solutions examined. Key aspects being:

·Identity authentication: authentication of voter registration

·Right to vote authentication: authentication of the right to cast a vote

·Vote sealing and non-repudiation of vote accuracy: proof of the authenticity of cast votes and that the vote could not have been altered from the voter's intention

·Vote confidentiality: vote may not be observed until the proper time

·Voting Audit: Proof that all genuine votes has been accurately counted and none lost